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Nuclear command and control

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nuclear command and control (NC2) is the command and control of nuclear weapons. The U. S. military's Nuclear Matters Handbook 2015 defined it as the "activities, processes, and procedures performed by appropriate military commanders and support personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment."[1] The current Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised] defines it as "the exercise of authority and direction, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations by the President as the chief executive and head of state."[2]

United States

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In the United States, leadership decisions are communicated to the nuclear forces via an intricate Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS provides the President of the United States with the means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use. It is an essential element to ensure crisis stability, deter attack against the United States and its allies, and maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Nuclear Command and Control and Communications (NC3), is managed by the Military Departments, nuclear force commanders, and the defense agencies. NCCS facilities include the fixed National Military Command Center (NMCC), the Global Operation Center (GOC), the airborne E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), and the E-6B Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO)/Airborne Command Post (Looking Glass)[3]

The current Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised] states: "The President bases this decision [to employ nuclear weapons] on many factors and will consider the advice and recommendations of senior advisors, to include the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and CCDRs."[2] Note that both the 2015 and the 2020 Handbooks describe themselves as "unofficial."[4][5]

The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is entering the design review phase, as of 22 September 2021.[6]

Bypass

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On 27 June 1950, two days after the beginning of the Korean War, commander of Strategic Air Command Curtis LeMay made a covert agreement with Robert Miller Montague, commanding general of Sandia Base where the gravity bombs assigned to SAC were stored. The agreement allowed for SAC to take control of the bombs in the event of a nuclear attack and loss of communication with the President and "the alternate headquarters USAF". LeMay said "We had no idea of what confusion might exist, or who the president might be, or where, if a bomb hit Washington. ... I doubt if I would have retaliated if Washington were the only target hit. But I certainly would not have waited until half the country were destroyed."[7]

STRATCOM Order of battle

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United States Strategic Command has responsibility for the US' nuclear triad of strategic nuclear weapons, but does not have responsibility for all tactical nuclear weapons in US service.

Other countries

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Nuclear Matters Handbook 2015: Chapter 6". Archived from the original on 2016-05-10. Retrieved 2016-05-27.
  2. ^ a b "Chapter 2: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, Planning and NC3". Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised]. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters. 2020. Retrieved 20 September 2021.
  3. ^ Lloyd, A. T. (2000). A Cold War legacy: A tribute to Strategic Air Command, 1946-1992. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Pub. p.290
  4. ^ "Nuclear Matters Handbook 2015". Archived from the original on 2015-12-16. Retrieved 2016-05-27.
  5. ^ Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised]. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters. 2020. Retrieved 20 September 2021.
  6. ^ Theresa Hitchens (22 Sep 2021) Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program
  7. ^ Rhodes, Richard (1995). Dark sun: the making of the hydrogen bomb. Sloan technology series. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. p. 440. ISBN 978-0-684-80400-2.